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The United States as Antitrust Courtroom
to the World: Jurisdiction and Standing
Issues in Transnational Litigation
Spencer Weber Waller*
"As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a
States"**
litigant drawn to the United

I. Introduction
This is the year that antitrust went international. It is also the
year that antitrust entered the popular consciousness. Now I'm not
talking about the Microsoft litigation in the United States 1 or the
2
G.E./Honeywell decision in the European Union, but I am talking
about two major motion pictures and a Broadway musical that all
deal with antitrust.
First, at the beginning of 2000, there was the film called
AntiTrust3 starring Tim Robbins as a sort of Bill Gates like character
which taught us that stealing other people's intellectual property and
then having them killed is, indeed, a violation of a number of our
laws. Then there was Zoolander4 starring Ben Stiller, which posited
*

Professor and Director, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola

University Chicago School of Law.
** Smith Kline & French Ltd and Others v. Bloch, [1984]
E.C.C. 103 (C.A.)
(Lord Denning).
1 See Information on the United States v. Microsoft Settlement, available at

http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms-settle.htm
(last visited Feb. 15, 2002).
2

[hereinafter Microsoft Settlement]

The Commission ProhibitsGE's Acquisition of Honeywell, IP/01/939, July 3,

2001, available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt=

%20gt&doc=IP/01/939101RAPID&lg=EN (last visited Feb. 15, 2002).
' ANTITRUST (MGM 2001).
4 ZOOLANDER (Paramount Pictures 2001).
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the existence of a centuries old international cartel of fashion
manufacturers who sought to assassinate world leaders who opposed
their agenda of free trade and lax child labor laws. There is even a
Broadway musical about a company that privatizes, monopolizes, and
then ets legislation requiring the use of their pay toilets in New York
City.
Beyond offering you these antitrust tidbits about pop culture,
this essay discusses jurisdiction and standing. It deals with the reach
of U.S. laws over conduct abroad that affects our market. This is a
topic that has been with us since the Alcoa decision in 1945. 6 It was
the topic that Kingman Brewster wrote about in the first edition of
Antitrust in American Business Abroad in 1958, the work that I am
privileged
to be responsible for preparing and updating the new
7
edition.
I want to discuss three aspects of the issue of
extraterritoriality. The simple answer is our laws apply beyond our
borders. Most other countries are coming to this view as well. But the
real question is what are the limits.
First, there is the question of jurisdiction over so-called
"import commerce" - conduct abroad that was intended to and/or
substantially affects the U.S. market and what role comity should
play as a limitation on so-called "effects" jurisdiction. Most observers
thought we had put these issues to bed with our Supreme Court's
decision in Hartford Fire.8 But, it turns out that the lower courts are
keeping the flame of international comity alive, if just barely.
The second, and more important, question is the interpretation
of what started out as a little-known, and remains, a badly-written
statute from 1982 called the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements
Act ("FTAIA").9 This is a statute that deals with all international
antitrust cases, except the HartfordFire situation dealing with import
commerce.
This has been where the real action has been in past years,
probably because of the consequences of Hartford Fire. The courts
at http://www.urinetown.com/flash/index.html (last visited
Feb. 15, 2002).
6 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
5 URINETOWN,

7 See generally JAMES R. ATWOOD, KINGMAN BREWSTER, & SPENCER
WEBER
WALLER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (3d ed. 1997 & annual

supp.).
8

Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764 (1993).

9 15 U.S.C. § 6A (2001).
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do not understand the FTAIA. Almost all of the opinions are simply
wrong or they reach the right result for the wrong reason. As a result,
the courts are botching the Congressional purpose underlying the
statute and misconstruing the proper role of antitrust in foreign
commerce cases, particularly global cartel cases.
Finally, I will briefly discuss how the FTAIA may be dwarfed
by three developments which will truly make the United States the
candle drawing further litigants inexorably toward its flame as part of
the growth of private rights of action worldwide.

II. United States Antitrust Jurisdiction Over Import
Commerce
Take the classic paradigm of competitors colluding as to
price, production, territories, or any of the other varieties of per se
unlawful conduct that would normally land one in jail and having to
pay a whopping fine. Now assume that all the acts of the conspiracy
take place not in Cleveland, New York, and Chicago, but in some
combination of Geneva, Switzerland, Tokyo, Japan, and Lima, Peru.
What changes?
We start in 1945 with the Second Circuit speaking on behalf
of the Supreme Court in Alcoa (the Supreme Court could not muster
a quorum). Alcoa taught us that if the defendants intended their acts
to affect the U.S. market, and they indeed affect our market, then the
conduct was punishable under U.S. antitrust law.10 The court must
still have personal jurisdiction over the defendant, but the conduct
was subject to our law. What happened between 1945 and the mid1970's was that the U.S. courts virtually ignored the intent
requirement of Alcoa and they so devalued the amount and nature of
the effect on the U.S. market that eventually anything more than a de
minimis effect on the U.S. market established U.S. subject matter
jurisdiction." At one point, a commentator noted that there were 249
straight foreign commerce actions 12in the U.S. courts, none of which
were dismissed for lack of effects.
This angered both our enemies, but more importantly it
angered our friends. The reaction of foreign governments,
10 Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 416.
"1 Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680,
687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
12 WILBUR FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE U.S. ANTITRUST LAW 498-

543, app. B (2d ed. 1973).
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particularly those that were otherwise friendly to the United States,
such as the United Kingdom in particular, created the sense that the
overall interests of the United States were not being well served by
this all-out assault on. anticompetitive behavior anywhere in
worldwide commerce using our antitrust laws. Many people,
including the late Kingman Brewster, began to argue that the U.S.
should adopt
what Brewster called a broad "jurisdictional rule of
13
reason."
This is a terrible phrase but a pretty good idea. The gist of it is
that there should be no subject matter jurisdiction unless there is a
substantial intended effect on the United States, and that the U.S.
interest is not out-weighed by the interests of the foreign parties and
the foreign countries affected by the exercise by our jurisdiction.
Versions of this test were adopted by the Ninth Circuit in
Timberlane,14 the Third Circuit in Mannington Mills, 15 but not in all
of the circuits. In particular, the Seventh 1Circuit
and the D.C. Circuit
6
emphatically rejected the Timberlane test.
It appeared that comity as a meaningful constraint on the
exercise of effects jurisdiction was the wave of the future until the
U.S. Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in Hartford Fire. Hartford Fire
was the Supreme Court's first opinion concerning the effect of
comity on whether the United States had subject matter jurisdiction,
also described as jurisdiction to prescribe, over anticompetitive
conduct outside our borders. The Supreme Court held that our
antitrust laws applied to an agreement by British insurers and reinsurers to change the nature of certain insurance coverage and
boycott those that opposed it. The Court reintroduced the element of
intent. The foreign conduct must be intended to affect our market in
order to be subject to our law.1 7 HartfordFire also held that the effect
of the foreign anticompetitive
conduct must be direct, substantial, and
18
reasonably foreseeable.
13 KINGMAN BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BusINEss ABROAD 301-

08 (1958).
14 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th
Cir. 1976).
15 Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
16 See In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); see also
Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(rejecting comity balancing of interests test as judicially unworkable).
17 HartfordFireIns. Co., 509 U.S. at 796.
18 Id.
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The Court then less successfully dealt with the issue of
comity. Our antitrust laws made unlawful what was permitted, and to
a large extent encouraged, in England by the regulation of their
reinsurance market. The Supreme Court ultimately held that once you
have an intended, direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect on the U.S., the courts should not consider international
comity, unless the foreign policy and the U.S. policy pose a "true
conflict," meaning that if you comply with one you violate the
other. 19 What you compel in England must be illegal in the United
States or vice-versa. In Hartford Fire, the defendants were not
compelled to act as they did, and hence comity should not be
considered once jurisdiction to prescribe was found.
In so holding, the majority destroyed a very useful concept.
They equated international comity with a doctrine of foreign
sovereign compulsion. 20 Unless one forces you to do something
subject to penalty of law abroad, this will not constitute the kind of
comity that a U.S. court will recognize as a basis to decline to
exercise jurisdiction. This appeared to pretty much kill off the
concept of comity in either government cases or in private cases for
two reasons. 2 1 First, there is very little in the world that is flat out
compelled by other governments. Other governments rarely do that to
their own businesses. Second, the U.S. antitrust enforcement
agencies, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and the
Federal Trade Commission, have stated that they will consider
comity, but only as a matter of prosecutorial discretion. Once the case
enters the courts, the agencies take the position that comity is mostly
about the conduct of our foreign affairs and if the United States
government has considered the relevant factors and decided
nonetheless to proceed, then it is not a court's business to say
otherwise. 22
This, however, has never been tested in litigation. My view is
that the government is probably wrong, but that in the real world, a
district court would have to be supremely sure of itself to come to a

'9

Id. at 798-99.

20 See generally Spencer Weber Waller, Redefining the Foreign Compulsion
Defense in U.S. Antitrust Law: The JapaneseAuto Restraints and Beyond, 14 LAW
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 747 (1982).
21 See generally Spencer Weber Waller, The Twilight of Comity, 38 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 563 (1999).
. 22 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS § 3.2 (1995).

HeinOnline -- 14 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 527 2001-2002

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 14: 523

different conclusion on the merits of a comity claim than our
executive branch.
The narrow view of comity as limited to true conflicts applies
to both private civil cases as in Hartford Fire and has been adopted
for criminal cases as well in the Nippon Paper case of the First
Circuit. 23 Hartford Fire thus laid the ground work for the Clinton
administration's rather spectacularly successful cartel prosecution
program in the late 1990's with cases like ADM, vitamins, graphic
electrodes, and many other record breaking enforcement actions.
But then, something funny happened. Sometimes you have
the lower courts engaged in what law professors have called gorilla
warfare, where you have a rule that the Supreme Court enunciates
that just doesn't take for some reason. 24 In this area, certain lower
courts often behave as if Hartford Fire does not exist. The Ninth
Circuit, in a case called Metro Industries v. Sammi Corp., simply says
Timberlane is the standard that should be followed and pretended that
Hartford Fire did not happen. 25 Similarly, in the Southern District of
New York, one judge routinely dismisses cases on the grounds of
comity finding so-called true conflicts in a way that suggests he never
read Hartford Fire. While Senior Judge Charles Haight has been
reversed by the Second
Circuit on this issue, he finds other ways of
26
dismissing the cases.
We have a situation where the Supreme Court is clear
(regardless of whether they are right) and yet comity continues to be
used as a factor in the lower courts to throw out cases in a way that
may make sense, but is not in accordance with the Supreme Court's
holding in HartfordFire.

23

United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997), cert.

denied, 522 U.S. 1044 (1998).
24 William L. Reynolds & Spencer Weber Waller, Legal Processand the Past
of Antitrust, 47 SMU L. REv. 1811, 1816 (1995) (describing failure of ruling from

legal process perspective when lower courts engage in process of guerilla warfare
to undermine binding precedent).
25 Metro Indus., Inc. v. Sammi Corp., 82 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 868 (1996).
26 See, e.g., Filetech S.A.R.L. v. France Telecom, 978 F. Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y.
1997), rev'd, 157 F.3d 922 (2d Cir. 1998), dismissed on remand on sovereign
immunity grounds, 2001-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,228 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). See also
Trugman-Nash, Inc. v. New Zealand Dairy Board, 954 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
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III. Jurisdiction Over Exports and Everything Else
The more interesting and perhaps more important issue is the
interpretation of the terribly worded Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act ("FTAIA"). 7 When you unscramble all the
double and triple negatives, the language of the statute tells us a
couple of things. First, it did not codify the standard for jurisdiction
over import commerce. Jurisdiction over import commerce, and the
role of comity if any, is not covered by a statute. That is why the
debate over the meaning of Hartford Fire is important. It is federal
common law that the Supreme Court could change. Hartford Fire
was a 5 to 4 decision. One vote changes the law of the land and
obviously the lower courts give it life in all these interesting factual

settings.
A. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
The FTAIA principally deals with jurisdiction over export
conduct. The principal animating force behind the FTAIA was a fear
in the late 1970's and early 1980's that our antitrust laws were a
significant deterrent of export activity. 28 The argument was that the

27

15 U.S.C. § 6A (2001) states:
This Act [15 U.S.C.S. §§ 1 et seq.] shall not apply to conduct involving
trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with
foreign nations unless(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect --

(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce
with foreign nations, or on import trade or import
commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign
nations, of a person engaged in such trade or commerce in
the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of this
Act [15 U.S.C.S. §§ 1 et seq.], other than this section.
If this Act [15 U.S.C.S. §§ 1 et seq.] applies to such conduct only
because of the operation of paragraph (1)(B), then this Act [15 U.S.C.S.
§§ 1 et seq.] shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export
business in the United States.
28 See generally Spencer Weber Waller, The Failure of the Export Trading
Company Program, 17 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 239 (1992).
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United States and our balance of trade and export competitiveness
(read our trade balance with Japan) was being hurt because of the
perception that our antitrust laws were chilling export conduct in a
way that was not the case in other countries (again think Japan).
Congress wanted to make clear a very simple proposition U.S. firms can engage in anti-competitive conduct that injures foreign
markets and foreign buyers. We do not care because either it is good
for us, it is none of our business, or at a minimum it is somebody
else's business. Such conduct should not be illegal under our law and
to the extent it is illegal in another country, that is for someone else to
decide. Firms may have to get advice 'about the foreign antitrust
ramifications of their conduct, but not about the U.S. antitrust laws.
Picture two firms that wish to collude and fix price solely as
to export conduct. Also assume that there are no spill-over effects in
our market and they are not exchanging information that has any
possibility of hurting the U.S. market. If they are solely injuring
foreign buyers outside our market and there is no effects on the U.S.
markets or U.S. exporters, they may proceed as a matter of U.S.
antitrust law just because they feel like it. At the same time Congress
passed the FTAIA as to jurisdiction, they also passed a statute called
the Exporting Trading Company Act, which was designed to let firms
receive certification in advance by the government that such conduct
would not be illegal.29
Under the FTAIA, antitrust claims involving exports from the
U.S., or solely foreign commerce (neither U.S. domestic commerce
nor imports into the U.S.) are not subject to U.S. jurisdiction, unless
there is a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on
U.S. markets or a similar effect on the export opportunities of a U.S.
exporter.
Congress also required that these effects must give rise to "a
claim" under the antitrust laws, 30 clarifying that the necessary effect
on the U.S. or its export opportunities must be an anticompetitive
one. In so doing, Congress created an ambiguity that has given rise to
a series of interesting cases. The direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect on the U.S. must give rise to "a" claim under the
antitrust laws. There are seven recent cases as to whether "a" means
64a" or "a"means "the. ' ' 31 These courts are wrestling with the question
29

See generally Waller, supra note 28.

30

15 U.S.C. § 6(a)(2) (2001).

31 This actually gives some legitimacy to all those questions when President
Clinton was trying to parse the meaning of the word "is" during the impeachment
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of who is the proper plaintiff in cases where it's pretty clear there is
the requisite effect on the U.S. market.
B. Whose Claim Matters?
The real issue is, does the plaintiff's claim have to arise from
the anti-competitive effect in the U.S., or is it enough that there is
such an effect in the U.S., even if the claim is being litigated by
someone outside our market. The first question is whether the
defendant's action have to give rise to an anti-competitive effect in
the U.S. While Congress could have meant any substantial effect, pro
or anti-competitive, they probably meant that the effect had to be an
anti-competitive effect to give rise to "a" claim.
The second question is: does the required anti-competitive
effects have to give rise to the particular plaintiff's claim. While I
think the answer should be no - that is the controversy.
The best illustration is the Heeremac case in the Fifth
Circuit. 32 Heeremac dealt with several Scandinavian firms in a
worldwide conspiracy involving giant marine barges used to haul and
install a 40,000 ton oil rig. It is a textbook conspiracy in the sense
that there are seven barges of this sort in the entire world, and they
are owned by a tiny handful of companies. This is a clear global
market. Moreover, some of these platforms are in the Gulf of Mexico
and the oil drilled is imported into the United States. There is thus a
direct, substantial, and reasonable foreseeable effect on the United
States. The hard question is who gets to sue in the United States. In
the Heeremac case, the plaintiff is a Norwegian company that is only
affected in its North Sea operations. Although it is a world market,
and there are all kinds of implications for the United States, the
particular plaintiff only overpaid for those barges for its drillings in
the North Sea.
The majority stated:
[T]he commerce that gives rise to the action here -- the

contracting for heavy lift barge services in the North Sea -was not United States commerce with foreign nation but
commerce between or among foreign nations .... Therefore,
we doubt that foreign commercial transactions between
foreign entities in foreign waters is conduct cognizable by
controversy.
32 Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS v. Heeremac VOF, 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir.
2001).
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33

In terms of interpreting the statute, the majority believes that
the effect on United States commerce - in this case the higher prices
paid by the U.S. companies for heavy lift services in the Gulf of
Mexico - must give rise to the claim that the plaintiff asserts against
the defendants. In order to sue, the plaintiff's injury must stem from
the effect of higher prices for heavy lift services in the Gulf of
Mexico. Under the Fifth Circuit decision the Scandinavian companies
can not sue for the injuries they have suffered in Scandinavia.
The dissent authored by Judge Higgenbottom proceeds quite
differently. He states:
The plaintiff here is a foreign company, true enough, but it
was injured by the same acts of defendants that injured
American plaintiffs whose right to seek recovery of their
losses the district court has recognized in this litigation.
With the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
Congress set out to insulate U.S. business from its antitrust
laws for certain business conducted outside this country. Its
central purpose was to assist U.S. business in competing
abroad.
Judge Higginbotham was not persuaded that Congress
intended to close the door to a foreign company injured by the same
illegal conduct when the illegal conduct produces the required
domestic effects.
Although this is a little technical, there is a lot at stake when
you have any kind of a global antitrust violation. Who gets to sue in
U.S. court? It is a matter of crucial importance because of what is
available when you sue in U.S. courts that you can not get even if you
are able to even sue anywhere else. There are treble damages, but that
is just the start: extensive discovery, jury trials, class actions,
contingent fees, and even potentially punitive damages; all the other
things that makes U.S. litigation so controversial around the world.
This same basic issue over the interpretation of the FTAIA
has arisen is a number of cases. The first is Kruman v. Christie's
InternationalPLC.35 This is the auction house price fixing case that

33

Heeremac, 241 F.3d at 426.

34

Id. at 431.

35 129 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd in part and vacated in part by

No. 01-7309, 2002 WL 398290 (2d Cir. Mar. 13, 2002).
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has been extensively featured in the media. On the government side,
there has already been guilty pleas from the two principal
international auction houses over the fixing of buyer and seller
commissions, and the separate conviction of the former chairman of
Sotheby's. 36 In the private case, the plaintiffs were buyers in auctions
outside the United States. Basically, they either bought or sold items
at the London auctions of Christies and Sothebys. In some cases, the
goods that were being sold were displayed in the U.S. prior to sale.
This case has a number of U.S. links that perhaps make it an easier
case than Heeremac. Nonetheless, the district court in the Southern
District of New York held, and its hard to disagree in general, that
unless the court is to impute to Congress an intention to establish an
antitrust regime to cover the world, the answer must be NO - you can
not let these people sue. This may be right in the abstract, but it is
wrong to conclude that the precise conduct that injured the plaintiffs
occurred only abroad. That is the weakness of the decision in
Christie'sthat resulted in reversal on appeal.
In the private litigation in Microsoft, there is an allegation of
monopolization of worldwide markets for software for computer
operating systems. Microsoft obviously has been found liable in the
U.S. government case. 37 In the private treble damage class action, an
action was brought on behalf of all purchasers globally: direct
purchasers, indirect purchasers, U.S. purchasers, and foreign
purchasers. The indirect purchasers were dismissed on the basis of
Illinois Brick38 and the foreign purchasers were all dismissed on the
basis that while there was an effect on the United States market, that
effect did not give rise to the foreign plaintiffs claims. 39
In IRI v. A. C. Neilsen, the court approached the critical issue
as a matter of standing. The court concluded that even if there is
jurisdiction, a plaintiff who has a claim, but not a claim relating to

Returning to the theme of antitrust as pop culture, it has been reported that
Sigourney Weaver attended the government trial against Richard Taubman, the exchairman of Sotheby's, for the purpose of playing the role of Diana Brooks, the
former president of Sotheby's, who pled guilty and cooperated with the
government, in an upcoming HBO film.
37 See Microsoft Settlement, supra note 1.
38 Ill. Brick Co. v. Ill., 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (with minor exceptions limiting
36

private treble actions under the federal antitrust laws to entities which purchased
directly from the defendants).
39 In re Microsoft Corp., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Md. 2001).
40 127 F. Supp. 2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

HeinOnline -- 14 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 533 2001-2002

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 14: 523

effects on the U.S. market, would not have standing under U.S. law.
There are such strong effects on the U.S. export business of a U.S.
exporter that this decision is clearly wrong, but not of great
precedential value.
The court basically said if anything bad happened, it
happened to the foreign subsidiaries of the plaintiff. This is a
different issue in the antitrust law, and one of the few times where the
Copperweld doctrine is likely to help a plaintiff. 41 The Copperweld
decision holds that, for antitrust purposes, companies and their
subsidiaries that they control are one entity, not two entity so to the
extent an integrated company's operations are harmed, the plaintiff
has been harmed. Thus, the plaintiff has standing in that case. This
case is also on appeal.
Another interesting case in this area is on appeal in the
Seventh Circuit. The Copper Antitrust Litigation42 was argued in
September 2000 before a very distinguished panel that included
Judge Diane Wood. Judge Wood has special expertise in international
antitrust and is the principal author of the most recent international
antitrust guidelines of the government, which include discussion of
jurisdiction over foreign commerce.43 Copper Antitrust Litigation
involved an old fashioned corner of a commodities market. Most, but
not all, of the copper was traded on the London metals exchange.
However, some of the contracts were traded in New York, the copper
was physically warehoused in the United States, and prices in the
U.S. rose. The plaintiff is a German company who was injured both
in London and in the United States. The district court simply got this
case wrong factually and the odds are that the Seventh Circuit is
going to re-instate the litigation.

IV. The Brave New World of International Antitrust
Litigation
That completes my tour of the chaotic state of jurisdiction and
standing. Let me give you a brief glimpse into the future. Sooner or
later the interpretation of the murky language of the FTAIA will be
definitively settled, but there are other even broader frontier issues to
be decided. If you look at the Christies opinion, you can get a
41

Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Sheet & Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752

(1984).
42
43

In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 117 F. Supp. 2d 875 (W.D. Wisc. 2000).
See supra note 22.
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glimpse of the future. The future is a series of attempts to litigate
claims on behalf of worldwide classes of purchasers in the United
States. For the plaintiffs, the FTAIA is just one of a number of
potential theories that are being tested. One such theory is to sue on
behalf of anyone anywhere who is injured by an over-charge,
monopolization, or other antitrust violation, because there is a
customary international law of antitrust. 44 Closely related to this
theory is bringing similar allegations under the Alien Tort Claims
Act, based on characterizing the economic injury as a human rights
violation. There is language, however, buried deep in the Christies
opinion and the Microsoft opinion discussing
these theories and
45
criticizing them as bordering on frivolous.
It almost does not matter whether these theories win
acceptance in the United States. I do not think these theories are ever
going to be the basis of a recovery in the United States in the near
future, but the growth of antitrust regimes worldwide and at the true
international level suggest they are not frivolous. The lawyers who
use these innovative theories also are ready to create and develop a
network of private rights of action and lawyers to execute these cases
around the world on behalf of purchasers outside the United States.
The number of countries that have private rights of action are
growing and include more than just the member states of the E.U.
Depending on the nature of the conspiracy, you can have between
twenty and thirty private rights of action pending in those countries.
Maybe there are not treble damages, maybe discovery is not going to
be as broad in the United States, but there are ways to coordinate
these actions to simulate what it would be like to sue on behalf of
everybody in the U.S.
Finally, there is the possibility of using the supplemental
jurisdiction of federal courts to try foreign private rights of action in
U.S. courts applying foreign law.4 6 In the end, whether these cases
are brought here or abroad, we are back to the idea, that U.S. antitrust
laws, and their core of a vigorous private rights of action, are the
flame that draws the world to our court.

44 I have argued elsewhere that there is in fact a different kind of customary
international law of antitrust. See Spencer Weber Waller, The Common Law of
InternationalAntitrust, 34 NEW ENG. L. REv. 163 (1999).
45 Kruman, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 628; Microsoft, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 717.
46

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2001).
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